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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CHARLES THOMAS DUFFY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
7294

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for personal injuries brought under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U. S. C. A., Sec.
51 et seq.), which will be sometimes hereinafter referred to
as the F. E. L. A. (R. 1-6). For purposes of convenience
the respondent, Charles Thomas Duffy, will hereinafter be
referred to as the plaintiff. The appellant, Union Pacific
Railroad <Company, will hereinafter be referred to as the
defendant.
Plaintiff, Charles Thomas Duffy, was injured on the
29th day of January, 1947 (R. 117). He was, and for 28
years prior thereto had been, an employe of the defendant,
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Union Pacific Railroad Company (R. 90). On the 11th day
of October, 1946, Duffy was operated on by Dr. Rees
Anderson of Salt Lake City for a gallbladder condition (R.
175). This particular operation was not in any way connected with Duffy's employment; and no claim was made by
Duffy of any liability on the part of the railroad company
with reference thereto (R. 1 to 6 inclusive, 134). On
November 20, 1946 Duffy was released for work by Dr.
Anderson after having convalesced from the gallbladder
operation (R. 10f7, 108, 180). At the time of the operation
for the gallbladder trouble an incision had necessarily been
made into Duffy's abdomen and this incision had healed
sufficiently to permit Duffy's return to work by the 20th
of November, 1946, in the opinion of Dr. Anderson who had
performed the operation (R. 185, 186).
During the remainder of 1946 and the month of January,
1947 Duffy worked regularly as a brakeman in passenger
service (R. 108). Until the day of the accident, January
29, 1947, Duffy had handled his regular shifts with no
particular trouble (R. 108). On the day of the accident
Duffy was working as a rear end brakeman traveling from
Caliente, Nevada, to Salt Lake City, Utah, on train No.
44, which was a mail and express train (R. 92). This train
necessarily had to travel through the railroad company's
yards at Milford, Utah. The main line track upon which
the train was traveling was a single track, that is, said
track was used by trains traveling both east and west (R.
93). At Milford, Utah, the railroad company maintained
a yard in which a track known as No. 1 track ran generally
parallel with the main line and immediately south thereof,
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railroad directions (R. 95). It was the custom for many
trains traveling through this yard to leave the main line
and travel along track No. 1 through the Milford yards in
order to allow other trains proceeding in the opposite direction to pass. The movement is and was made from the
main line to track No. 1, or vice versa, over what is known
as a crossover track at the west end of the Milford yards (R.
95, 96, 98) . Between the main line and this crossover
track there was a switch which allowed the tracks to be so
aligned that a train could either proceed easterly directly
along the main line or could be turned into the crossover.
Likewise, at the intersection of the crossover track and
track No. 1 was another switch which could be so operated
that trains could proceed straight along track No. 1 or could
be routed on or off the crossover (R. 95, 96). These switches
in addition to serving the function of moving the rails to
permit trains to travel as desired also operated block signals
on the main line which controlled the movement of all trains
as follows: Unless both switches were aligned in such a
manner as to allow through traffic on the main line and also
on No. 1 track, so that in effect the crossover track was
disconnected at both ends, red block signals would be displayed on the main line stopping all trains from proceeding
along the same (R. 140).
'These switches were both what are known as low
ground throw switches, sometimes referred to as hub
switches. They were operated by a lever slightly shorter
than a yardstick in a manner hereafter to be described (R.
146). These switches were two of the most important
switches in the yard and were used many times each day
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(R. 141, 143). Because of the necessity of proper operation of the block signals and also in order to make possible
the movement of trains through the Milford yards, it was
the duty of the head end brakeman on eastbound trains
taking the crossover and No. 1 track through the Milford
yards to align both switches so that the train could proceed
eastward over the crossover onto the No.1 track and thence
eastward through the Milford yards (R. 95, 96). The train
would therefore be stopped immediately west of the first
switch and the head end brakeman would align both switches
in a suitable manner. Thereafter the train would pull
through the crossover until the rear end of the train had
passed the s~econd switch connecting the c~rossover to
the No. 1 track; and it would then be the duty of the rear
end brakeman to realign the switches for through traffic
both on the main line and on No. 1 track ( R. 95, 96, 97).
This was the standard position of the switches and the
condition in which they were always left when not being
specifically used because of the necessity of keeping the
block signal system open for traffic (R. 139, 140). On the
day of the accident when train No. 44 arrived at Milford,
eastbound, the head end brakeman, whose name was McIntosh, threw both switches so that the train could proceed
over the crossover and eastward on No. 1 track. This was
less than five minutes before the accident (R. 149, 150).
Thereafter train No. 44 proceeded through both switches
onto No. 1 track and Duffy alighted from the rear end to
discharge his duty as a rear end brakeman by realigning
both switches (R. 109). Duffy experienced no particular
difficulty in realigning the switch between the main line
and the crossover track (R. 109), but while throwing the
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switch connecting the crossover track with No. 1 track he
sustained an incisional hernia in the incision which had been
theretofore made in connection with the gallbladder operation (R. 109, 113, 126, 180).
The manner in which this type of switch is thrown
customarily and in which Duffy threw the switch on the
day of the accident, insofar as the mechanical operation of
the switch is concerned, was described to the jury by using
a ruler and demonstrating to the jury (R. 116). If a yardstick be laid on the floor in an easterly and westerly direction and it be considered that the west end of the yardstick is a hub, then the operation of the switch is accomplished by grasping the east end of the yardstick, lifting up
until the same reaches a vertical position, and then pushing
downward until what had theretofore been the east end of
the yardstick is now the west end (R. 116, 145, 146). Thus
the lever which operates the switch moved through a 180°
arc to complete the movement. This lever is fastened by a
locking mechanism at each extreme of the movement in
such a manner as to require unfastening with a key before
the lever may be thrown (R. 146). Ordinarily the switch is
thrown by the use of the switchman's hands, but if the same
is tight the feet are used to assist in pushing the lever back
to a horizontal position (R. 241, 270, 271). Duffy testified that this particular switch was exceptionally hard
to throw and that in order to successfully accomplish the
operation he raised the switch to a vertical position, put
one hand on the switch lever, and braced the other hand
against a lamp post with a signal light on it which was
in the immediate vicinity and completed the throwing of
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the switch by pushing out from his body with both hands
(R. 117). Since we do not intend upon this appeal toquestion the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to justify submission of this case to a jury, there is no purpose to be served
by detailing any further the difficulties which Duffy encountered in throwing the switch nor his evidence as to
its difficulty of operation.
After Duffy arrived at Salt Lake City upon completion
of the trip he again went to Dr. Rees Anderson who discovered the incisional hernia ( R. 125, 126) . For reasons
which are in conflict in the evidence Duffy was not operated
on immediately but was permitted to return to work as a
switchman until February 28, 1947 (R. 131). On the 3rd
of March, 1947 Duffy entered a hospital in Salt Lake
City and on the 4th of March, 1947 Duffy was operated on
for the correction of the incisional hernia (R. 136, 137). On
June 16, 1947 Duffy returned to his work (R. 137). It was
stipulated by the parties that the total loss of wages
sustained by Duffy as a result of this accident was $1,300.00
(R. 132, 133). The testimony with reference to Duffy's
physical condition after the accident is unmistakably clear
to the effect that by the time of trial and even long prior
thereto Duffy had made a complete recovery (R. 191).
Certainly the record contains absolutely no evidence of any
permanent injury sustained by Duffy in this accident or
even any testimony that the effects of the injury had not
completely disappeared by June 16, 1947 when Duffy returned to work (R. 191). All the evidence with reference
to pain and suffering sustained by Duffy will be hereinafter set forth:
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A. Well, I had a sharp pain in my stomach and
burning sensation which felt like warm water running over my stomach, a stinging sensation. (R. 113)

* * *

Well, I don't think you quite understand
my question. What can you say about the presence
or absence of pain?
A. Oh, I told him about the pain I had had,
still had it.
Q.

Q.

Well, describe that pain to the jury?

A. \Vell, after throwing this switch, I had
severe pain right in the pit of my stomach here, and,
as I said before, felt like there was some water
running out, maybe I had broken open.
After I had went on the train, went in the dressing
room, opened up my shirt, looked, it was all right,
only red, little bit red.
Q. That night, when you were at home, what
can you say with respect to the presence or absence
of pain?

A. Night when I got home I still had the pain,
but the area red was larger.
Q.

Were you able to sleep that night?

A. Not very well ; I rolled around quite a bit,
quite painful; felt stiff like.
Q.

Did you do anything for the pain?

A. No, I couldn't. I didn't get in Salt Lake
City until sometime around seven-thirty. (R. 126)

* * *
And from the time that you saw the doctor
until you went to the hospital for the operation
what can you say about the presence or absence of
pain?
Q.
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A. Well, I had pain now and then; more of a
trial, you know, sometimes get a sharp pain.
Q.

Could you stoop down?

A. If I stooped down I seemed like something
was moving up, like that.
Q.

How about evenings, and your ability to

sleep?
A.

I slept fairly well about a week afterward.

(R. 128)

* * *
Q. Were you conscious or unconscious when
the operation was performed?

A. Well, I was conscious when he started, but
I don't remember it. I remember them starting to
cut, just feel like something scraping. (R. 12'9)

* * *
Q. And what can you say with respect to the
presence or absence of pain during that fourteen
days?

A. Well, there was quite a burning, sharp,
shooting pain all the time. (R. 130)

* * *
Q. After you were at home, and during this
period, what can you say about the pain?

A. Pain? Yes, I had pain when I came home,
but I had some pills, morphine tablets they would
give me in the hospital, when I left. (R. 130)
Dr. Rees Anderson testified with reference to the matter
of pain and suffering as follows :
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Q. And did he make some complaint of pain,
to you, at that time when he came to see you?

A. I will have to refer to the record. Yes, he
did complain of pain.
Q. And to what would you attribute his pain
after, at that time?

A. I felt that the pain that he complained of
was probably due to· the fact that we had actually
sutured the fascia in an imbricated or underlying
fascia, this is bringing it together in a tight or
unnatural condition. This was a safeguard to allow
us two or three rows of suture material when repaired. I attribute to the, that technical procedure
for the operation, the subsequent pain.
Q. And the pain, then, I understand, resulted
from the fact that the man's stomach was drawn
little tighter than in a normal-than it was normally,
and had been, and it took some time for the body
to adjust to it; is that correct?

A. That is correct, with the exception it was
the abdominal wall, not the stomach.
Q. Abdominal wall. And wouldn't you expect
that after the adjustment was made, and became
used to it, for that pain to go away?

A.

Yes.

Q. Do you know of any other thing that might
cause him pain, as a result of that operation-! mean
up to, say, six months after the operation?

A. I suppose there is some pain after any operation when the skin and tissues are cut through,
until the healing ocurs, but, in my opinion, that was
the major cause of his pain. (R. 189, 190)
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It also appears from Dr. Anderson's testimony that the
operation to repair the incisional hernia was a major operation in the same sense that all operations are considered
serious (R. 183, 184, 185), but the gallbladder operation
undergone by Duffy in the fall of 1946 was a far more
serious operation than the repair of the incisional hernia
(R. 184). In fact, it is apparent from the description given
by Dr. Anderson as to the repair of the incisional hernia
that the operation consisted simply of resewing the incision theretofore made in the gallbladder operation in a
more secure manner (R. 193, 194).

The case was tried to a jury upon this evidence and
upon plaintiff's complaint praying for $12,500.00 damages;
and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff for
$12,,500.00, less $3,500.00 for contributory negligence, a net
verdict of $9,000.00 (R. 21). This verdict was not unanimous (R. 322).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that
the· defendant was an insurer of the safety of its employes
while on duty, as it did in the first sentence of the second
paragraph of instruction No.3 (R. 45, 46).
2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury in the
manner contained in the second paragraph of Instruction No.
9 (R. 50).
3. .The. trial court erred in instructing the jury in the
manner contained in the first paragraph of the Court's
Instruction No. 11 (R. 51).
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4. The trial court erred in permitting and inviting the
jury to award damages to the plaintiff for future pain and
suffering and for .future loss of bodily function, since there
was no evidence in the record to justify the submission of
such elements of damage to the jury for consideration. (See
Instruction No. 16, lines 10, 11, 18 and 20; R. 55.)
5. The trial court erred in failing· and refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant in its Requested Instruction No.9 (R. 33).
6. The trial court erred in failing and refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant in its Requested Instruction No. 10 (R. 34).
7. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
for a new trial for the reason that the verdict in this action
awards to the plaintiff excessive damages, given under the
influence of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury
(R. 63, 71).
8. The trial court erred in failing and refusing to grant
to the defendant a new trial because of the accumulation
of errors mentioned in the foregoing assignments of error,
all duly excepted to by the defendant (R. 71).

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS AN INSURER OF THE SAFETY OF ITS EMPLOYES WHILE
ON DUTY.
In Instruction No. 3 the trial court advised the jury
that the defendant was an insurer of the safety of its employes while on duty in the following language:
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"The statute upon which this action is based is
the Federal Employers Liability Act and said Act
provides every common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several
states shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce, and for such injury resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
employees of such carrier in its appliances, machinery, or other equipment." (R. 45, 46).
The basic premise for appellant's argument that the
above instruction constitutes error is our contention that
the Federal Employers' Liability Act requires proof of
negligence on the part of the railroad company in order to
justify recovery by an injured employe. Liability under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act is still based on negligence.
"The act does not make the employer the insurer
of the safety of his employes while they are on duty.
The basis of his liability in his negligence, not the
·fact that injuries occurred." Ellis v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 329 U. S. 649, 91 L. Ed. 572, 67 Sup.
Ct. 598.
"f_iability arises from negligence, not from
injury, under this act." Brady v. Southern Railway
Co., 320 U.S. 47 6, 88 L. Ed. 239, 64 Sup. Ct. 232.
1

"There are some who think that recent decisions
of this Court which have required submission of
negligence questions to a jury make, 'for all practical purposes, a railroad an insurer of its employees.'
See individual opinion of Judge Major, Griswold v.
Gardner, 155 F. (2d) 333, 334. * * * This assumption, that railroads are made insurers where
the issue of negligence is left to the jury, is inad-
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missible. It rests on another assumption, this one
unarticulated, that juries will invariably decide
negligence questions against railroads." Wilkerson
v. McCarthy & Swan, Trustees of the Denver & Rio
Grande Weste1-n Railroad Company, 336 U.S. 53.
Even if the implications of Mt. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in the ll'"ilkerson case, supra, to the effect
that a jury question is presented in all F'ederal Employers'
Liability cases, are justified, nevertheless the concept of
negligence as a basis for liability remains a jury question
and should be presented to the jury with proper instructions. This principle was clearly violated by the court's
Instruction No. 3. The italicized portion of the quoted
instruction specifically informs the jury that the employing
railroad shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in interstate
commerce. This portion of the instruction can only be
understood to mean that the defendant was an insurer of
the safety of Duffy and its other employes while on duty.
Unless this portion of the instruction is qualified or restricted by the remaining portions of the instruction, then
certainly error was committed by the trial court. This must
be so because even the most liberal decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States recognize the right of the defendant to trial by jury properly instructed that the basis
of the railroad's liability is negligence. See the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Wilkerson case,
supra:
"Trial by jury as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of the several States
presupposes a jury under proper guidance of a disinterested and competent trial judge."
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It is plainly evident that the italicized portion of the
instruction quoted above is in direct conflict with the
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States construing the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We respectfully submit that the remaining portion of said instruction
reading as follows: ", and for such injury resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the employees of such carrier in its appliances, machinery, or
other equipment," does not constitute such a qualification
of the italicized portion of said instruction as to rectify
the giving thereof by the trial court. The qualification, if
such it be, is in our estimation so unintelligible as to be an
ineffective restriction on the first part of the instruction,
even if it were intended by the trial court as a restriction
of any sort. It does not appear that the last phraseology of
the quoted instruction would be intelligible to a trained
lawyer, much less to a lay jury. The last words of the
instruction do not seem to have any meaning as applied to
the previous portions thereof and, in fact, appear as an
interjection of the court in nowise connected with the context of the previous portions of the instruction; but if there
be any intelligent interpretation of the last portion of the
quoted instruction, certainly such interpretation will not
be that any restriction is intended as to the previous state-ments contained therein. The last portion of the instruction
does not even purport to he a qualification of the italicized
phraseology but is clearly an addition thereto. The word
"and" is not restrictive in nature but conjunctive, and if the
jury were able to glean any meaning from the abortive attempt to paraphrase the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
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then the only reasonable assumption is that the jury would
have interpreted the same as stating two bases of liability
under the act: (a) injury to an employe while on duty; (b)
injury caused by negligence of the railroad con1pany. It
cannot fairly be said that the phraseology contained at the
end of the quoted portion of the instruction is a qualification
of the court's first statement therein contained to the effect
that liability should be imposed upon the railroad by the
jury upon proof of employn1ent, plus injury.
We concede that in other instructions the court advised
the jury that liability was based on negligence; but the very
first mention of the law applicable to the matter of liability
in this case was the following statement of the trial court:
"The statute upon which this action is based is
the Federal Employers Liability Act and said Act
provides every common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several
states shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce."
The vice of this instruction is more readily apparent
when as in this case the defendant has admitted, (a) employment, (b) interstate commerce, and (c) injury. The
error contained in this instruction was magnified by the
arguments of counsel for the plaintiff who in this case, and
habitually, refer to and discuss the Federal Employers'
Liability Act in argument to the jury as a law holy in
nature, akin to an 11th Commandment. No later instruction could erad~cate the erroneous impression which might
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tainly, if other instructions ;which more aptly stat€ the
principles of liability were read and understood by the jury,
Instruction No. 3 must have appeared inconsistent therewith, and it is now impossible for this court or counsel to
state which of the conflicting instructions were actually
followed by the jury. We therefore respectfully submit
that a fair summary of the possible effect of Instruction
No.3 on the jury is as follows:
(1) The jury is told that liability may be
found on the basis of employment, plus injury;
(2) The jury is told, and it appears uncontradicted, that these two facts have been substantiated;
( 3) That the court failed to make a proper
qualification of this statement in Instruction No. 3
limiting such liability to injuries caused by negligence of the railroad ;
( 4) In other instructions the court told the
jury that liability was based on negligence; and
(5) That it is impossible to state which doctrine of liability was followed by the jury.
There can be no dou]?t that this error alone requires
reversal of the judgment in this case.
Railroad carriers have a decreasingly smaller amount
of protection from the courts under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act as to what may be found by a jury to be
negligence (see Wilkerson case, supra) ; conversely it should
be increasingly important that the jury be advised that
proof of negligence is necessary to recovery lest the protectection of jury trial, mentioned in the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Black in the Wilkerson case, also be removed:
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"This assumption, that railroads are made insurer where the issue of negligence is left to the
jury, is inadmissible. It rests on another assumption, this one inarticulate, that jurors will invariably
decide negligence questions against railroads. This
is contrary to fact as shown * * * by other
F.E.L.A. cases * * *"
If verdicts based on instructions of the type given by

the trial court in Instruction No. 3 are pennitted to stand,
then even the protection described by Mr. Justice Black
will have been taken from defendants under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
In view Qf the recent United States Supreme Court
opinions making practically any injured employe case under
the F. E. L. A. a jury question as to negligence, it would
seem that the very minimum of fair play and fireside
justice which should be afforded the employer is an unmistakably clear instruction to the effect that liability
should not be imposed in the absence of negligence. We do
not believe that the defendant was afforded this right by
a set of instructions containing an instruction such as the
quoted portion of Instruction No. 3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY IN A HYPOTHETICAL MANNER NOT
BASED ON EVIDENCE BY ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
In the second paragraph of Instruction No.9 the court
told the jury, in substance and effect, that it might not find
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence in attempting
to operate the switch in question while suffering from a
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muscular weakness in his abdomen due to the previous operation, if the plaintiff was operating and using the inside crossover switch at Milford, Utah, in the usual, ordinary and
customary manner. What evidence given at the trial led the
court to so instruct the jury we do not know. Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 7 was given by the court as its
Instruction No. 9, despite the fact that no evidence in the
record indicated that plaintiff was operating the switch in
the usual, ordinary and customary manner at the time of
his injury, and despite the further· fact that the evidence
of every witness who testified concerning the same is to
the contrary. In the case of State Bank of Beaver County
v. HoUingshead, 82 Ut. 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, the Utah
Supreme Court condemned as error the giving of hypothetical instructions not supported by evidence in the following language:
"It is proper and generally necessary for the
court in its instructions to submit to the jury the
theory of the case as presented by the defendant as
well as that presented by the plaintiff. It is necessary, however, that whatever theories are presented
by pleadings or otherwise, in order to be entitled
to be submitted by way of instructions to the jury,
some evidence must have been received by the court
in support of such theory. * * * There is a complete absence of anything in the evidence that would
make the instruction applicable to the defendant,
and yet the instruction is so worded and constructed
that it is evident the jury could make just that
application of it. We think the giving of this instruction referred to as 7A was error. It is the duty of the
court to instruct the jury as to the law applicable
to the evidence of the particular case, having refer. ence to the parties thereto. The language as was
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used might well have been employed in stating legal
principles, but the litigants are entitled to have the
law as declared applicable to the particular facts
of the case as they affect the parties to which they

refer."
This case presents a square holding that instructions
not based on evidence, no matter how accurate the principles
of law therein contained may be, should not be given by the
trial court. To the same effect see Smith v. Cannady, 45
Ut. 521, 147 P. 210; Everts v. WorreU, 58 Ut. 238, 197 P.
1043; and State v. Pa.rker, 104 Ut. 23, 137 P. (2d) 626, at
page 632. These cases make it unmistakably clear that instructions with no foundation in the evidence are not to be
given by a trial court. In the case at bar, as is equally clear,
no evidence was offered by the plaintiff or by the defendant
that the method of operation of the switch chosen by Duffy
was the usual, ordinary and customary method. See the
testimony of the witness Connell (R. 249, 250), and the
testimony of the witness Robinson (R. 261). Consequently,
there seems no justification for an instruction such as Instruction No. 9, which invites the jury to disregard the
unusual manner in which Duffy threw the switch as possible
contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of the United
States having made nearly any conduct a jury question on
negligence, contributory negligence should be governed by
the same loose principles, and the jury should have been
permitted to find Duffy guilty of contributory negligence
for throwing the switch in a distinctly unusual manner; but,
in any event, it was clearly error to advise the jury that
Duffy was not guilty of contri'butory negligence if he had
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used the customary method when no evidence that the
method chosen was the usual method had been received.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT THE DUTY OF THE DEFENDANT
RAILROAD COMPANY WAS TO KEEP THE SWITCH
IN SUGH WORKING CONDITION THAT AN INJURY
WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO RESULT FROM OVEREXERTION TO ANY EMPLOYE THROWING SAID
SWITCH.
In the first paragraph of Instruction No. 11 the following principle of law was given to the jury by the trial
court:
"It was the duty of the defendant railroad company to keep this switch in such working condition
that an injury would not be likely to .result from
overexertion to any employe throwing said switch."

The quoted portion of Instruction 11 informs the jury
that the railroad company has an absolute duty to make the
switch safe to any employee required to work the same, regardless of the manner in which the employe may choose to
operate the switch. We respectfully urge that such is not
and never has been the law even under the F. E. L.A. The
only purpose for giving the quoted portion of the instruction
must have been to advise the jury of the railroad's duty
as to the condition of the switch so that the jury would
be in a position to decide whether the railroad was negligent in that the duty had been breached. It therefore follows that this instruction is erroneous in at least two
particulars : first, the quoted portion of Instruction No.
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11 does not limit the railroad's duty to the exercise of
reasonable care in keeping said switch in safe working
condition. Mr. Justice Douglas in the case of Ba-iley v.
Central Ve-rmont Railway, Inc., 319 U. S. 350, 87 L. Ed.
1444, 63 Sup. Ct. 1062, defined the law under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act as follows :
"At common law the duty of the employer to
use reasonable care in furnishing his employees with
a safe place to work was plain * * * that rule
is deeply ingrained in federal jurisprudence * * *
reasonable care becomes then a demand of higher
supremacy, and yet in all cases it is a question of
the reasonableness of the care * * * reasonableness depending upon the danger attending the
place or the machinery * * * it is that ·rule
which obtains under the Employers' Liability Act."
Certainly this decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States makes it clear that the duty imposed upon
the railroad is to exercise reasonable care to keep its appliances in safe condition rather than an absolute mandate
that such appliances must be kept safe. In the case of
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 87 L.
Ed. 610, ·63 Sup. Ct. 444, Mr. Justice Black expressed the
same proposition in the following language :
"In this situation the employer's liability is to
be determined under the general rule which defines
negligence as the lack of due care under the circumstances; or the failure to do what a reasonable and
prudent man would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances of the situation; or doing what such
a person under the existing circumstances would not
have done."
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See also the statement of Mr. Justice Black in the
Wilkerson case, supra, as follows:
"But the issue of negligence is one for juries to
determine according to their finding of whether an
employer's conduct measures up to what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the
same circumstances."
· The rule is not, therefore, that the railroad company
must furnish a reasonably safe appliance, but rather, that
the railroad company must use reasonable care to furnish
a reasonably safe appliance. This doctrine found further
expression in the case of Lmoden v. Hansen, 134 Fed. (2d)
340. In that case the plaintiff was injured when a defective
spring switchstand broke causing the plaintiff to fall to the
ground and causing the upper part of the switchstand to
fall on top of him. In passing upon liability, the Circuit
Court of Appeals stated as follows:
"The defendant was under the continuing duty
of exercising ordinary care to see that the instrumentalities and appliances furnished for the use of
plaintiff as well as the premises where he was required to work were maintained in a reasonably
safe condition."
In other words, the mere existence of a defect in the
switch upon which Duffy was injured is not negligence; the
negligence, if any there be, must be founded on conduct of
the railroad permitting the existence of such defect which
fglls short of the standard of reasonable care.
The second vice of the quoted portion of the instruction
is even more apparent and the error thereof is emphasized
by the fact that defendant's Requested Instructions Nos. 9
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and 10 advised the court of the defendant's position in this
regard. The instruction completely fails to take into account the duty imposed upon the employe by the law to
exercise reasonable care for his own safety. Certainly the
law does not require of the defendant that it make the
switch on which Duffy was injured accident-proof. All that
is required is that the switch be placed in such condition as
to be reasonably safe for an employe using the same with
reasonable care for his own safety. In the case at bar the
jury determined that Duffy was guilty of contributory negligence and consequently determined that Duffy had failed
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety in the manner
in which he threw the switch. This factor demonstrates the
weakness of the court's instruction since the jury might well
have believed that the switch was safe for an employe exercising reasonable care for his own safety but that, nevertheless, the railroad company was liable since the switch
had not been made safe for any employe using the saine. To
illustrate this possibility we submit the following examples.:
Assume that the switch on which Duffy was injured might
have been in any one of the three following conditions : first,
such condition that 50 units of energy were required of any
employe throwing the same ; second, such condition that
100 units of energy were required of any employe throwing
the same; and third, such condition that 200 units of energy
were required of any employe throwing the same. Assume
further that a force of 200 units of energy required dangerous exertion on the part of any switchman in the opinion
of the jury; second, that a force of 100 units of energy required exertion which was only dangerous to a switchman
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failing to exercise reasonable care for his own safety ; and
third, that a force of 50 units of energy required exertion
:which was safe as to any employe. We respectfully submit
that the duty of the defendant was to exercise reasonable
care to furnish a switch to its employes in the second of
these conditions, i. e., a condition reasonably safe to said
employe if the employe exercised reasonable care for his
own safety. Consequently, while the duty of the railroad
company in the abstract remains fixed at the standard
denominated "reasonable care," nevertheless the railroad's
duty as applied to the facts of this case in reference to the
quantum of care required was dependent upon the conduct of
the employe. The court's Instruction No. 11 failed to take
this factor into account, despite the fact that defendant's
Requested Instructions Nos. 9 and 10 asked that this proposition be submitted for the jury's determination.
No evidence was introduced by either party hereto
showing any defective mechanical condition of the switch;
instead, all evidence of both parties was addressed to the
difficulty of the operation of the switch. Such difficulty of
operation is a relative thing since no one stated the exact
amount of force required to throw the switch on the occasion
·of plaintiff's injury or on any other occasion. Instruction
No. 11 required the jury to find that the defendant had
violated its duty and was consequently negligent, regardless
of any consideration as to whether the employe throwing
the switch had exercised reasonable care for his own safety.
Such instruction imposed upon the defendant the absolute
duty of making its switches or any other equipment acCident-proof.
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The simplest piece of equipment improperly used may
not be reasonably safe. A hammer used for pounding a nail
may be dangerous if improperly used, but the. fact of improper use does not make the hammer itself unreasonably
dangerous. On a more complicated piece of equipment, such
as the switch upon which Duffy suffered his injury, the
condition of the equipment and the method of its use must
always be interrelated, i. e., what will be reasonably safe
equipment with one method of operation may be unsafe with
another method. Since the court's Instruction No. 11 is in
absolute contradiction to the foregoing principles, all of
which are so well settled as to be beyond successful refutation, we submit that the defendant was deprived of its right
to a trial by jury properly instructed. All that is left to
defendants under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is
the right to argue matters of this sort to a jury. From even
this somewhat dubious advantage the defendant railroad
was foreclosed by Instruction No. 11.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
JURY TO AWARD DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR
PAIN AND SUFFERING TO BE SUSTAINED BY THE
PLAINTIFF IN THE FUTURE AND FOR LOSS OF
BODILY FUNCTTON TO BE SUSTAINED BY THE
PLAINTIFF IN THE FUTURE.
The court's Instruction No. 16, at lines 10, 11, 18 and
. 20, permitted and invited the jury to award the plaintiff

compensation for pain and suffering, both mental and
physical, which he would probably endure in the future,
and also for loss of bodily function which he would probably
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
suffer in the future. This instruction was given at the request of the plaintiff, despite the fact that not one word
of evidence indicated any likelihood, probability or even
possibility that such loss would be occasioned to the plaintiff. The only evidence in the whole record dealing with
Duffy's probable future condition is contained in the testimony of the plaintiff's witness, Dr. Rees Anderson. (See
page 19'1 of the Record.) Not one word in all the evidence
at the trial indicated that Duffy was suffering pain or that
he had been suffering pain from his injuries for more than
one year prior to the trial. Not one word of testimony indicated that Duffy's bodily function had been impaired by
his injuries or that it was probable or likely that his bodily
function would be impaired by his injuries, and the evidence
conclusively shows that for more than one year prior to the
time of trial Duffy's earning capacity had not been affected
to the slightest extent by any injury sustained in this accident. Nevertheless, in Instruction No. 16 the jury was
permitted and invited to consider these elements of future
damage in arriving at its verdict. Perhaps this erroneous
instruction, induced by plaintiff's Requested Instruction
No. 5, may be the reason for the outrageous verdict returned
in this case; but whether this instruction be the explanation of the size of the verdict rendered or not, there is no
doubt but that the submission of said instruction constituted
reversible error.
Elements of damage which may be considered by a
jury in arriving at its verdict are no different in principle
than elements of negligence or other issues which may be
considered by a jury. If the trial court had submitted to
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the jury an instruction permitting the jury to find the
defendant guilty of negligence by virtue of its failure to
furnish adequate lighting at the scene of the accident, no
one would seriously contend that such an instruction by the
court was proper. This would be obvious because no evidence was offered indicating any valid basis for the giving
of such an instruction on negligence. The cases have plainly
indicated that the same rule applies to elements of damage
as would apply to the issue of negligence. In the case of
Jensen v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry. Co., 257 N. W.
257, the Supreme Court of Nebraska was faced with an
identical situation in a personal injury case arising out of
a fall. In the opinion on rehearing of that case, which a ppears as cited above, the court made the following obser-·
vations:
"Defendant complains of an instruction given by
the court relative to the measure of damages to which
plaintiff was entitled if recovery was awarded her.
In the instruction it was said that if the jury found
for plaintiff she should be awarded compensation
for her pain and suffering endured 'and that it is
reasonably established will in all probability be endured by her as a result of her said injuries.' The
rule applicable to future pain and suffering has been
considered on several occasions by this court.
"In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McDowell, 66
Neb. 170, 92 N. W. 121, it was held: 'In an action
for personal injuries, compensation can be recovered
for only such future damages as are shown with reasonable certainty to be consequent thereupon.'
"In Burkamp v. Roberts Sanitary Dairy, 117
Neb. 60, 219 N. W. 805, a similar instruction to the
one given was held to be erroneous. In that case
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it was said (page 66 of 117 Neb., 219 N. W. 805,
807) : 'This was error in so far as it permitted the

jury to allow damages for pain which the plaintiff
will 'probably suffer in the future'.'
"The instruction complained of was prejudicially erroneous in that it permitted the jury to award
damages for future pain and suffering which may
not have been proved with reasonable certainty."
In the case of Missouri, Pac. Transportation Co. v.
Kinney, 135 S. W. (2d) S6, the Supreme Court of Arkansas

considered the same problem with a similar result. In that
case, which was a suit for personal injuries to the right arm
of the plaintiff causing an injury to the ulnar nerve, the
trial court had instructed the jury that plaintiff might recover damages for "the physical pain and mental anguish
suffered and endured by him in the past, if any, and that
which he will endure in the future; the effect of the injury
on his health ; pecuniary loss from his diminished capacity
for earning money through life, if any." Upon consideration
of this instruction the court made the following remarks:
"Before such a recovery can be allowed, the permanency of the injury must be made to appear from
the evidence with reasonable certainty and that
future pain and suffering are inevitable and if they
appear to be only probable or uncertain they cannot
be taken into the estimate."
That the evidence in the case at bar, far from indicating a reasonable certainty of future pain and suffering and
of future loss of bodily function, instead is absolutely devoid
of evidence even indicating a possibility thereof, is so clear
that we herewith challenge counsel for the respondent to
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point out any evidence which indicates even remotely the
possibility of permanent injury sustained by Duffy.
In the case of Putnam v. Unionville Granite Works,
122 S. W. (2d) 389, the Supreme Court of Arkansas considered this problem and made the following comments:
"Instruction No. 2 authorized the jury to take
into consideration as bearing upon the measure of
damages the question of permanent injuries. The
positive evidence of the only medical witness, testifying for plaintiff, was that his injuries are not permanent in their character. It was positive error to
instruct on permanent injuries, for here the question
does not rest on probability, possibility, or speculation; it does not exist, having been definitely eliminated by plaintiff's own medical evidence."
To find a more direct statement covering the exact
situation presented in the case at bar is difficult to conceive.
In the Missouri case of Martin v. Springfield Water Co.,
128 S. W. (2d) 674, the court reaffirmed this proposition
in the following language:
"Complaint is made as to plaintiff's third instruction which instructs the jury as to permanent
injury or future suffering of the plaintiff with compensation therefor, when there was no evidence as
to such issues. The plaintiff's own physician testified that there were no permanent injuries. * * *
It was error under this testimony to instruct as to
permanent injury."
This proposition is in reality so obviously the law that
no useful purpose would be served by further argument.
Suffice it to say that the court's Instruction No. 16, given at
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the request of the plaintiff, which uses the word "compensation" or "compensate" no less than six times in what
appears to be a calculated attempt to influence the jury to
the·notion that the F. E. L.A. is a workmen's compensation
act, clearly permitted the jury to award damages for
elements of damage in no way substantiated by evidence.
The verdict equal .to the prayer of the plaintiff's complaint
having resulted, it appears unlikely that plaintiff will be
able to successfully contend that the error was no~ prejudicial.

THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS SO EXCESSIVE
AS TO REQUIRE THE GRANTING OF A NEW TRIAL
IN THIS ACTION.
By its verdict in this case the jury assessed damages
sustained by the plaintiff in the sum of $12,500.00. It is true
that the jury reduced the amount of the verdict by $3,500.00
for contributory negligence of the plaintiff, but regardless
of this reduction the fact remains that the damages assessed
were $12,500.00. This is the only assumption justified because both parties are bound to assume that the jury followed the court's instructions and performed its function
in accordance with the instructions. (See ·the opinion of
Mr. Justice Black in the Wilkerson case, supra). The evidence further revealed, without any dispute, that plaintiff's
total economic loss by reason of his injuries was $1,300.00.
This was his stipulated loss of income. By its Instruction
No. 16 the court told the jury that it might consider the
following elements in arriving at the amount of damages
to be awarded:
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( 1) Pain and suffering, both mental and physical, which has been endured by the plaintiff and
which he will probably endure in the future;
( 2) Loss of bodily function which plaintiff
has suffered or which plaintiff will probably suffer
in the future;
( 3) Loss of past earnings.
Item No. 3 above being fixed in the sum of $1,300.00, $11,200.00 of the verdict in this case must be accounted for by
items No. 1 and No. 2 above. As has heretofore been pointed
out in this brief we are of the opinion that the court erroneously allowed the jury to consider future pain and suffering and future loss of bodily function, but even if these
items were properly to be considered by the jury, nevertheless, in the absence of any evidence thereon, no appreciable portion of the verdict may properly be attributable to
these factors. The remaining item which must in and of
itself justify $11,200.00 of this verdict is the pain and
suffering endured by Duffy as a result of the hernia and
of the operation to correct the same. For the court's convenience in considering this matter we have heretofore in
this brief set forth every word of testimony given by any
witness for either the plaintiff or the defendant describing or discussing the pain and suffering sustained by Duffy.
We respectfully submit that if any reasonable person were
asked to compare this ordeal with the normal affairs which
a common person sustains in his every day life he could not
but conclude that the pain and suffering so expressively
stated by Mr. Duffy was no greater than that occasioned
to any person on the removal of an appendix and not much,
if any, more serious than an ordinary tonsilectomy.
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The Utah Supreme Court has heretofore made clear
the function of the Supreme Court of this State in passing
upon the size of verdicts. In the case of Pauly v. McCarthy,
in the opinion written by the court on mandate from the
Supreme Court of the United States, 109 Ut. 431, 184 P. (2d)
123, this court carefully considered previous Utah cases and
laid down the following rule :
"Some of the early cases recognized, at least
impliedly, that the trial judge might order a remission from an excessive verdict. Kennedy et al. v.
Oregon Short LineR. Co., supra; Nelson v. Southern
Pacific Railroad 'Co., 15 Utah 325, 49 P. 644. But
from the language used in these and other decisions
a view developed that this court was powerless to
interfere with a jury verdict, no matter how outrageous. This view was exploded in the case of Jensen
v. Denber & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185,
1192, where, after citing with approval many of
the cases above cited, we said:
"'Still the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may be granted
by the court below on the ground of 'excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.' Whenever that is
made to appear, the court, when its action is properly invoked, should require a remission or set the
verdict aside and grant a new trial. But, before the
court is justified to do that, it should clearly be made
to appear that the jury totally mistook or disregarded
the rules of law by which the damages were to be
regulated, or wholly misconceived or disregarded all
the evidence, and by so doing committed gross and
palpable error by rendering a verdict so enormous
or outrageous or unjust as to be attributable to nei-
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ther the charge nor the evidence, but only to passion
or prejudice. Whether a new trial should or should
not be granted on this ground, of necessity, must
largely rest within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
"'Still that court, in such particular, is not
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may nevertheless
be inquired into and reviewed on an alleged abuse of
discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary exercise of
power in such respect. Such a review is not review
of a question of fact, but of law * * * our pow-

er to correct a plain abuse of discretion or undo a
mere capricious or arbitrary exercise of power cannot be doubted.
"'We have said this much, in view of plaintiff's
contention and of opinions heretofore somewhat
loosely expressed at the bar, that in a case of tort
tried to a jury, no matter how enormous or flagrantly
outrageous a verdict may be, the trial court alone
is authorized to grant relief; and though that court
may, by a clear abuse of discretion, and by an arbitrary exercise of power, have gone as wild as did
the jury and suffered an outrageous and unjust verdict to stand, or on mere whimsical and capricious
grounds set a verdict aside amply supported by competent evidence, yet we are powerless to interfere.
We do not so understand the prior decisions. In all
of them where it was said this court is not authorized
to review a question of excessive damages, such
question being one of fact, the statements are qualified, except to ascertain 'if there is any evidence to
support the verdict,' 'except so far as may be necessary to determine questions of law.' We reaffirm
that. And since an assignment based on a ruling
alleged to have been made by an abuse of discretion
or by a mere capricious or arbitrary exercise of
power, in granting or refusing a new trial, presents
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

a question of law, not of fact, we may as such review
it.'
"Since the Jensen case above quoted, it is well
settled that this court has power to, and will, consider assignments of error based on excessive verdicts.

* * *
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion
for new trial, we may order the verdict set aside and
a new trial granted. Jensen v. Denver & R. G. Co.,
supra; and other ·cases cited above following that
decision."
In view of this analyzation of the principles it does not
appear necessary to cite the cases upon which the Pauly case
was based. We do, however, wish to call to the court's attention the case of McAfee v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot
Company, 6'2 Utah 115, 218 P. 98, wherein the court stated:
"We now take occasion to say that verdicts will
not be interfered with by this court on account of
being excessive unless the facts are such that the
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or that
the verdict is so excessive as to be shocking to one's
conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice
or corruption on the part of the jury. When a verdict is so excessive that it clearly indicates passion
and prejudice, a new trial should be granted unconditionally.

* * *
"Verdicts rendered 10, 15 or 20 years ago are
of little help in determining what amount is now
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excessive in a personal injury case. The present cost
of living must be considered, and the diminished
purchasing power of the dollar must be taken into
consideration when estimating damages. In Coke
v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624, it is said:
"'A few years ago such a sum might not have
been awarded by a jury, but in this day of high prices
the amount awarded cannot be said to be excessive.'"
The remarks above quoted with reference to the small
consequence to be attached to verdicts of 10, 15 or 20 years
ago are particularly appropriate in the present day when
money admittedly has less purchasing power than at other
occasions in the history of our State. It is, therefore, obviously a useless thing to cite to this court cases holding
particular verdicts to be excessive. Each case must stand
upon its own facts in light of the situation of its own time,
but granting that money is cheap today and that judgments
and verdicts for increasingly larger amounts are daily being
sustained as proper, nevertheless, we are unable to bring
ourselves to believe that the Supreme Court of this State
will affirm an award of $11,200.00 for the pain and suffering of resewing an incisional hernia. If we are in error in
this belief then our courts will have reached a new zenith in
sustaining the excessess of our modern juries. No case with
which we are familiar in any jurisdiction in the United
States has ever sustained such an award as this for the
relatively minor nature of Mr. Duffy's injuries and we are
unwilling to believe that the power of the Supreme Court of
this State for the prevention of injustice is so weak and
feeble a thing that it cannot correct a verdict so exorbitant
as the one in the case at bar.
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As to the proper procedure to be adopted by this court
in correcting the obvious error of the trial court in denying
defendant's motion for new trial, there are, of course, two
possibilities. The first method would be by declaring the
verdict to be so excessive as to indicate that the jury was
influenced by passion and prejudice, which might have substantially affected its deliberations on other issues in the
case, so that an outright grant of a new trial to the defendant would be required. (See the McAfee case, supra.) The
second method would be to require the plaintiff to remit
a portion of the judgment as was done in the case of
Shepard v. Payne~ 60 Ut. 140, 206 P. 1098.

It should not be necessary for this court to determine
which of these alternatives ought to 'be followed because a
new trial should be granted on the basis of the numerous
other errors discussed in this brief; but should the court
conclude that the defendanVs position on the other errors
assigned is not well taken, then this court would be facedwith a choice between the two alternatives outlined. The
principle which must guide the court in its choice between
these alternatives has heretofore been indicated by the
opinions above cited. That principle may be briefly stated
as follows : "If the verdict is so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury that from its size alone it ap.pears to have been arrived at by passion or prejudice, then
the proper remedy is by the granting of a new trial." If
the verdict is not excessive to that degree but only to such
degree that it appears the jury misunderstood the instructions or the evidence on damages, then remittitur of a portion of the verdict by the plaintiff should be required.
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It seems to us that no useful purpose could be served

by discussing this matter further than to say that $11,200.00
for the pain and suffering described in the evidence appears
to us, at least, to be so excessive as to require a new trial.
Large verdicts for loss of arms, legs, eyes, or for the death
of husbands and fathers may often be explained by the
natural sympathetic feelings which any normal person has
toward a maimed individual or a widow and minor children;
but the verdict in this case is so disproportionate that we
frankly state to the court that we are unable to conceive of
any feeling on the part of the jury which would justify the
same, except a desire of the majority of the members of the
jury to "pour it on" a large corporation as punishment for
the terrible sin of the defendant railroad company in giving
Mr. Duffy a high paying job. If this court agrees with us
that the excessiveness is of this nature, then our motion for
a new trial should have been granted and the trial court's
error in that regard should be corrected by now granting
defendant a new trial.
CONCLUSION

In summary of our position in connection with this
action we state to the court that the defendant was deprived
of a fair trial under the law by the court's instructions and
by the passion and prejudice of the jury against a large
corporation. We contend and urge first, that the trial
court instructed the jury that the defendant was absolutely
liable for Duffy's injuries, contrary to law; second, that
the court permitted the jury to award damages for elements
of damage not justified by any evidence; third, that the trial
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court erroneously advised the jury as to the duties imposed
by the law upon the railroad company in the exercise of due
care for the safety of its employes; and fourth, that when
the jury, through passion and prejudice at worst or ignorance at best, rendered a verdict so excessive as to shock the
conscience of any reasonable person, the trial court nevertheless denied defendant's motion for a new trial and refused even to reduce the verdict as a condition to the denial
of said motion. Any one of these errors standing alone
should justify the granting of a new trial, but in combination the cumulative effect thereof worked such a palpable
injustice as to require that the judgment be set aside and
a new trial granted on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
Counsel for
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